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Anticipated and unilateral climate policies are ineﬀective when fossil
fuel owners respond by shifting supply intertemporally (the green para-
dox) or spatially (carbon leakage). These mechanisms rely crucially on
the exhaustibility of fossil fuels. We analyze the eﬀect of anticipated
and unilateral climate policies on emissions in a simple model with two
fossil fuels: one scarce and dirty (oil), the other abundant and dirtier
(coal). We derive conditions for a ’green orthodox’: anticipated climate
policy may reduce current emissions, and unilateral measures may unin-
tentionally reduce emissions in other countries. Calibrations suggest that
intertemporal carbon leakage (between -3% and 1%) is less of a concern
than spatial leakage (19-39%).
JEL-Classiﬁcation: Q31, Q54
Keywords: carbon tax, green paradox, exhaustible resource, backstop, climate
change
1 Introduction
Well-intended climate policies may have perverse eﬀects. Climate policies typ-
ically become stricter over time and vary substantially across countries. Fossil
fuel owners, deciding when and to whom to sell their scarce resources, may re-
spond by speeding up extraction and selling to environmentally lax countries.
These side eﬀects can occur when fossil fuel reserves are limited and cheap to
exploit: a reasonable characterization for conventional oil and natural gas, but
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1much less for other important energy sources such as coal and unconventional
oil. In this paper we ask whether climate policy has unintended consequences
when there are two types of fossil fuels: one dirty and scarce, the other even
dirtier and abundant.
Policies that reduce future dependence on fossil fuels might encourage sup-
pliers, anticipating a future drop in demand, to bring forward the extraction of
their resources. When present emissions are more harmful than future emissions,
gradually increasing carbon taxes can be counterproductive: a green paradox
(Sinn, 2008a). Developing a carbon-free substitute for fossil fuels (a clean back-
stop) can cause a similar eﬀect (Strand, 2007; Hoel, 2011). Cost reductions for
the substitute decrease the scarcity value of fossil fuels, and thereby increase
fossil fuel supply in all periods before exhaustion.1
Likewise, when a group of countries reduces emissions unilaterally, pollu-
tion might move to other countries. This carbon leakage occurs through two
channels (Felder and Rutherford, 1993). Firstly, dirty industries relocate to
countries with laxer regulation. Secondly, a stringent environmental policy in
environmentally conscious countries causes the world market price of fossil fuels
to fall, increasing their use in lax countries. Estimated leakage rates range from
a modest 2-5% to over 100%, the latter implying that unilateral carbon reduc-
tion policies increase global emissions (Burniaux and Oliveira Martins, 2000;
Paltsev, 2001; Babiker, 2005).2
The crucial feature that drives the above mechanisms is the exhaustibility
of the resource. This causes the tradeoﬀ between current and future supply, and
thus the eﬀect of (expected) future policies on current supply and emissions. If
the resource is fully abundant, resource owners supply the myopically optimal
quantity in each period and country and the link between current and future
markets is severed. Exhaustibility is a fair assumption for conventional oil and
natural gas, which will be depleted in 50 to 70 years at current consumption
rates3. Coal and unconventional oil are much more abundant however. Coal
reserves are suﬃcient to last another 250 years, and tar sand deposits in Alberta
1The green paradox may vanish when the substitute has an upward-sloping supply curve
(Gerlagh, 2011). Van der Ploeg and Withagen (2009) ﬁnd that the green paradox occurs
for clean but expensive backstops (such as solar or wind), but not when the backstop is
suﬃciently cheap relative to emissions damages, as it is then attractive to leave part of the
oil in the ground.
2Studies on international environmental agreements ﬁnd a related eﬀect. Because environ-
mental standards are strategic substitutes, non-signatories will increase emissions (Barrett,
1994; Hoel, 1994).
3BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2010, p.6, p.12
2are estimated at 1800 bln barrels4. The supply of these resources is primarily
driven by costs rather than scarcity rents. Anticipated carbon taxes cause coal
mines to shut down, but do not increase near-term supply.
Coal and unconventional oil are signiﬁcant from an economic and a climate
change point of view. Coal satisﬁes a third of global energy demand and ac-
counts for almost half of energy-related CO2 emissions5, outranking petroleum
in emission intensity by 30-40%. The IEA expects coal supply to increase by
60% in 2035 under business-as-usual policies6; twice as much as the projected
increase in oil supply. Supply of unconventional oil, which is 20% more emission-
intensive than petroleum (Charpentier et al., 2009), may increase ﬁvefold to 11
mln barrels per day in 2035. These numbers suggest that in order to keep cli-
mate change within tolerable limits, it is imperative that coal and uncoventional
oil reserves remain largely unexploited (Gerlagh, 2011). A comprehensive as-
sessment of the eﬀectiveness of climate policies should take into account these
’dirty backstops’ and their unique characteristics.7
In this paper, we develop a simple model with two time periods or two
regions. We do not derive optimal policies, but present a descriptive analysis
of the eﬀect of future or unilateral climate policies on emissions. We generalize
assumptions in previous research along two important dimensions. Firstly, the
model contains three energy types: a dirty exhaustible resource (e.g. oil), an
even dirtier backstop (coal) and a clean backstop (solar). Secondly, we assume
types to be imperfect substitutes for one another. Previous theoretical studies
often assume perfect substitution, which is unrealistic. We model climate policy
as a carbon tax or a decrease in the cost of the clean backstop. We calculate
intertemporal or spatial carbon leakage as the increase in present emissions over
the decrease in future emissions, or the increase in non-adopting regions over
the decrease in adopting regions.
By virtue of the abundance of their resource, coal owners do not trade oﬀ
present and future extraction or supplying one country and the other. When
faced with a demand reduction in the future or in climate-conscious regions,
they will therefore not increase supply today or to lax regions. Oil emissions
may leak away to the present or to non-adopting regions, but the increased
oil supply in these markets reduces demand for dirtier coal. Carbon taxes can
4Alberta’s Energy Reserves 2010 and Supply/Demand Outlook 2011-2020, p.5
5International Energy Statistics, Energy Information Administration
6World Energy Outlook 2010, p.201, IEA
7Van der Ploeg and Withagen (2011) show that rising carbon taxes may not cause a green
paradox when coal, rather than renewables, is the primary alternative for oil.
3cause negative leakage when the substitutability between oil and coal diﬀers
between time periods or regions. We may call this a ’strong green orthodox’
(Grafton et al., 2010). Moreover, since carbon taxes decrease the price of oil
relative to coal, a future tax delays rather than accelerates oil extraction when
oil and coal are good substitutes in the future. Reducing the future cost of
solar decreases present emissions when oil and coal are good substitutes or if
the emission-intensity of coal is high.
Our contribution is twofold. Firstly, we oﬀer a general theoretical frame-
work that can make more accurate predictions than models that include only
one or two energy types or assume perfect substitutability. The presence of
an abundant dirty backstop reduces intertemporal and spatial carbon leakage
directly and indirectly, and may even cause negative leakage rates. By making
more speciﬁc assumptions, we can obtain similar ﬁndings as in other papers on
the green paradox. Secondly, our model is well-suited for empirical calibration.
For carbon taxes, we ﬁnd negative intertemporal leakage rates and spatial leak-
age rates in the order of 19-39%. For reductions in the future cost of renewables,
leakage is less than 1%. Our ﬁndings suggest that the green paradox is a small
concern relative to spatial carbon leakage.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the model.
Section 3 analyzes intertemporal and spatial leakage when carbon emissions are
taxed in the future (in a two-period model) or in one region (in a two-region
model). Section 4 studies the impact of reductions in the future cost of a clean
substitute. The models are calibrated with interfuel elasticity estimates from
previous work. Section 5 concludes. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 Model
Consider a model with three types of energy: an exhaustible resource, a dirty
backstop and a clean backstop. The backstops are inexhaustible, supplied com-
petitively and have constant marginal costs8. The exhaustible resource is sup-
plied competitively by a group of energy-exporters and costless to extract. For
the energy-exporters, it is always optimal to fully exhaust the fossil resource
stock S9. An energy-importing country derives utility from consuming energy.
Denote the exhaustible resource, the dirty and the clean backstop with super-
8An upward-sloping supply curve for the clean backstop reduces intertemporal carbon
leakage (Gerlagh, 2011).
9Relaxing this assumption reduces intertemporal leakage (van der Ploeg and Withagen,
2009; Fischer and Salant, 2010).
4scripts F, Z and C respectively. Demand functions are given by
di(pi,p−i), i ∈ {F,Z,C} (1)
Letting qF denote the equilibrium quantity of the exhaustible resource, its in-
verse demand function is
pF = ψ(qF,pZ,pC) (2)
Throughout the paper, we write shorthand di and ψ for (1) and (2), respectively.
Partial derivatives of di and ψ are indicated by a subscript of the corresponding
type. We make the following assumptions about energy demand
di
i < 0, di
j ≥ 0 (A1)
   di
i
    >
   di
j





Energy types are imperfect substitutes for one another: demand for each
type is non-decreasing in the price of other types (A1) and own-price eﬀects
are larger than cross-price eﬀects (A2). Cross-price eﬀects are symmetric (A3).
These assumptions hold for quasi-linear utility functions and, as we show in
Appendix A, if we can rewrite the demand structure as demand for a composite
good that is produced from F, Z and C according to a homogeneous function10.
CES demand functions satisfy this property.
Consumption of the exhaustible resource and the dirty backstop generates
a constant amount of emissions. The dirty backstop is more emission-intensive
than the exhaustible resource
e = ζFqF + ζZdZ,0 < ζF < ζZ
The model has a time or a space dimension and consists of two periods or
two regions, respectively. For brevity, we refer to period 1 and period 2 in the
theoretical analysis, but one may substitute this by non-adopting and adopting
regions. All variables corresponding to the second period (adopting region) are
denoted by capitals. Exhaustible resource owners discount future revenues at






10Some energy carriers are also used to produce other goods (e.g. plastics from petroleum).
This can be reconciled with assumption (A3) if the production function of the other good is
homogeneous of the same degree as that of the composite good.




Ψ(S − qF,PZ,PC) (4)
We allow for emissions in the ﬁrst period to be more harmful than emissions in
the second period. Total emission damages are
Σ = e + βE, β ≤ 1 (5)
When only cumulative emissions matter or when we use the model for a two-
region analysis, β is equal to one. When society and ecology can adapt more
easily to slow rather than rapid temperature increases (Hoel and Kverndokk,
1996; Gerlagh, 2011), near-term emissions have a higher weight (β < 1). The
green paradox entails a positive relation between the stringency of future climate
policy and emissions (Sinn, 2008b). Following Gerlagh (2011), we diﬀerentiate
between a weak green paradox (future climate policy increases present emis-
sions) and a strong green paradox (emission damages increase).
Deﬁnition 1. Denote the stringency of second-period climate policy by Θ. The








Analogous to the literature on (spatial) carbon leakage, we deﬁne the in-
tertemporal carbon leakage of a future climate policy as the share of period 2
emission reductions that ’leaks’ away to the ﬁrst period.
Deﬁnition 2. The leakage β∗ of an increase in the stringency of second-period








Both green paradoxes are related to the intertemporal leakage rate β∗ in a
straightforward way. As intertemporal leakage is positive if and only if the future
climate policy increases present emissions, the weak green paradox is equivalent
to β∗ > 0. The strong green paradox occurs if the leakage rate exceeds the
emission discount rate (β∗ > β).
The model has a spatial rather than intertemporal interpretation when r = 0
and β = 1. When one region implements a unilateral climate policy, β∗ is the
6share of emission reductions that leaks away to the other region. The unilateral
policy reduces global emissions when β∗ < 1, and reduces emissions in both
regions when β∗ < 0. We discuss carbon taxes (section 3) and investment in
green technologies (section 4) in turn.
3 Emission Taxes
Regulators who want to reduce carbon emissions may not be able to do so im-
mediately. Swift implementation of climate policies is often impeded by political
and technological considerations. Announcing carbon taxes or caps in advance
reduces compliance costs: it gives ﬁrms the opportunity to purchase abatement
equipment and adjust their production processes, and allows consumers to make
informed decisions about durable good purchases (Di Maria et al., 2008). The
European Commission notes that ”a suﬃcient carbon price and long-term pre-
dictibility are necessary”11 in order to meet the 80-95% EU emission reduction
target in 2050. Carbon taxes also vary between countries. Emission reduction
is a global public good, so individual countries have an incentive to free-ride on
others’ eﬀorts or misrepresent their preference for environmental quality. Inter-
national environmental agreements suﬀer from enforcement problems (Barrett,
1994). When globally coordinated measures prove impossible, climate-conscious
countries can only resort to unilateral policies.
Carbon emissions are taxed at a constant rate W in the second period. The
tax may also be interpreted as a willingness to pay to reduce emissions (Hoel,






PF − WζF 
(6)
A second-period carbon tax only aﬀects ﬁrst-period variables through the






We discuss the two components of this term in turn. The carbon tax increases
the period 2 producer price of the exhaustible resource and, by (6), the period
1 price if and only if the tax increases period 2 exhaustible resource demand at











  0 (8)
Holding the producer price constant, the carbon tax directly reduces exhaustible
resource demand in the second period by −ζFDF
F. The tax has an even stronger
eﬀect on the future price of the dirty backstop by virtue of its higher emission
intensity however. This induces substitution from the dirty backstop to the
exhaustible resource, increasing future exhaustible resource demand by ζZDF
Z.
By assumption (A3) (symmetric cross-eﬀects), this is equal to ζZDZ
F. The
period 1 exhaustible resource price goes up (down) if the net eﬀect of the tax









is positive (negative), i.e. if the substitutability between the dirty backstop and
the exhaustible resource is high (low) in period 2 and if the emission-intensity
of the dirty backstop is high (low).
The eﬀect of exhaustible resource prices on period 1 emissions is similar. An
increase in the period 1 exhaustible resource price directly reduces emissions by
−ζFdF
F. Higher exhaustible resource prices also encourage substitution towards
the dirty backstop, increasing emissions by ζZdZ





is positive (negative) if the dirty backstop and the exhaustible resource are good
(poor) substitutes in the ﬁrst period and if the emission-intensity of the dirty
backstop is high (low). This expression only diﬀers from ∂D
F
∂W through the time
indicator. In a spatial version of the model with two identical regions, the
condition for
∂ψ
∂W   0 is identical to the one for ∂e
∂pF   0. The leakage rate is
then always nonnegative. We formalize this in the following Lemma.




in which case β∗ = 0.
Proposition 1 describes the general case.
8Proposition 1 (weak green paradox). Following a carbon tax increase in period










  0 (11)
The weak green paradox is less likely if the substitutability between the ex-
haustible resource and the dirty backstop is diﬀerent in the two periods. Table 1
summarizes whether the weak green paradox occurs for diﬀerent values of dZ
F
and DZ
F and how these cases relate to previous research.
When demand for the dirty backstop is relatively inelastic with respect to
the exhaustible resource price in both periods (dZ
F and DZ
F are both low), the tax
reduces exhaustible resource prices and increases emissions in the ﬁrst period.
This is the classic green paradox result when exhaustible resource owners an-
ticipate a future carbon tax (Hoel, 2010). When demand for the dirty backstop
is inelastic with respect to the exhaustible resource price in the ﬁrst period but
elastic in the second (dZ
F is low, while DZ
F is high), the tax increases exhaustible
resource prices and reduces emissions in both periods. This case corresponds
to a scenario in which coal is only used to generate electricity today, but can
be converted to transportation fuel in the future. Oil owners delay extraction
in response to the tax, as the tax puts them at a comparative advantage in the
transportation market in the future. Since coal is a poor substitute for oil in
the short term, the decline in period 1 oil supply does not cause a surge in coal
demand. Our model provides a theoretical framework for the numerical ﬁndings
of Persson et al. (2007). They show that OPEC countries may beneﬁt rather
than lose from strict climate policies, because the price of synthetic substitutes
for petroleum-based fuels (e.g. diesel from coal) goes up faster than the price
of oil.
When coal demand reacts strongly to the exhaustible resource price in the
ﬁrst period but not in the second (dZ
F is high, but DZ
F is low), the tax reduces
exhaustible resource prices and emissions go down in both periods. This case
corresponds to a large coal-to-liquids (CTL) user abandoning the technology
in the future. Currently, only South Africa employs CTL processes on a large
scale12. As the substitutability between oil and coal is low in the second period,
oil prices decrease. This makes oil an attractive alternative for coal in the trans-
portation market in the ﬁrst period. Lastly, suppose that exhaustible resource
and the dirty backstop are good substitutes in both periods (dZ
F and DZ
F are
both high). The tax then increases exhaustible resource prices and increases
emissions in the ﬁrst period, as the dirty backstop is used more intensively
12Sasol’s Secunda CTL plant has a capacity of 160 kilobarrels per day (IEA, 2010).
9early on. This result connects to work of Smulders and van der Werf (2008)
and Di Maria et al. (2008), who analyze how an anticipated cap on the ﬂow of
emissions aﬀects the order of extraction when there is a high- and a low-carbon
fuel. The cap makes the low-carbon fuel more valuable and increases the use of
the high-carbon fuel in the period before the constraint becomes active.
Proposition 2 describes the eﬀects of a period 2 tax on period 2 emissions
and emission damages.




(iii) β∗ ≤ 1






F + (1 + r)DF
F






Ξ = (1 − β)ζFdF
F + ζZ  
dZ




(v) β∗ decreases in |DZ
Z|
In a spatial interpretation of the model, unilateral carbon taxes always
decrease global emissions. A higher own-price eﬀect of the dirty backstop causes
the tax to more sharply reduce period 2 dirty backstop use, and therefore reduces
leakage. The eﬀect of the own- and cross-price eﬀects of the exhaustible resource
on the intertemporal leakage rate cannot be signed because the eﬀect of the tax
on exhaustible resource extraction is ambiguous.13 Spatial leakage estimates in
excess of 100% (e.g. Babiker (2005)) rely on industry relocation eﬀects, which
we do not model explicitly. Numerous authors argue that changes in energy
prices are the most important determinant of carbon leakage however (Paltsev,
2001; Fischer and Fox, 2009; Kuik and Hofkes, 2010).
Although the tax increases future demand for the clean backstop, clean
backstop prices, quantities and elasticities do not appear in the conditions for
β∗ > 0 and β∗ > β. The clean backstop does not generate emissions, so dC does
not enter into either e or Σ. Furthermore, the tax does not aﬀect the price of
the clean backstop, so ∂e
∂W and ∂Σ
∂W do not contain any derivatives with respect
13Albeit through a diﬀerent mechanism (substitution between energy types rather than
intertemporal substitution in consumption), Eichner and Pethig (2009) also ﬁnd that a future
emission constraint need not cause a green paradox.









∂pF weak GP? Interpretation Related articles
low low - - yes classic green paradox Sinn (2008a); Hoel (2010)
low high + - no future diesel from coal technology Persson et al. (2007)
high low - + no South Africa abandons CTL
high high + + yes dirty fuel used in pre-tax phase
Smulders and van der Werf (2008)
Di Maria et al. (2008)
1
1Table 2: Oil and coal demand
Intertemporal Model Spatial Model
2009 2035 ROW EU
qF 29842 39201 24808 5034
pF 61.67 135 61.67 69.28
qZ 24644 36106 22798 1846
pZ 20.84 20.84 20.84 32.17
a Quantities in mln boe, prices in $ per boe b ζF =
0.37, ζZ = 0.54, t per boe c Deﬁnitions and sources
are listed in Table 1
to pC. The impact of the clean backstop on intertemporal leakage is implicit in
the demand functions for the exhaustible resource and the dirty backstop.
Interpreting (12) is not straightforward, but we can calibrate β∗ as esti-
mates of all parameters in (12) are available. Own- and cross-price eﬀects can
be rewritten as di
j = ηi
jqi/pj, where ηi
j is the elasticity of demand for type i with
respect to the price of type j. We estimate the magnitude of intertemporal and
spatial carbon leakage in the next subsection.
3.1 Empirical Calibration
Take oil as the exhaustible resource and coal as the dirty backstop. We observe
current energy demand and prices, and the IEA forecasts future demand and
prices. Table 2 presents an overview of these statistics. Oil and coal demand are
both expected to increase in 2035, though the relative increase is larger for coal.
The oil price more than doubles during the next 26 years; we assume the coal
price to remain constant. In the spatial model, the EU accounts for a small part
of global energy demand and uses relatively little coal. An empirical literature
on interfuel substitution estimates demand elasticities. This literature typically
distinguishes between coal and electricity as inputs in the industrial process.
Since most coal is used for electricity generation, we take the elasticities for
electricity as those for the dirty backstop14. We assume the elasticities to be
equal across time periods and regions.
We ﬁrst calculate the intertemporal leakage of a small global carbon tax in
14We multiply the elasticity of oil demand with respect to electricity prices by the global
share of coal-based electricity generation in total electricity generation, which was 0.41 in 2008
(CIA World Factbook 2009)














Pindyck (1979) -0.25 0.03 0.03 -0.12 -0.56 -0.18 -59.86 -0.00
Uri (1982) -0.57 0.05 0.15 -0.50 2.54 0.63 -249.35 0.00
Hall (1986) -0.70 0.09 0.24 -0.14 -7.82 -1.65 -54.32 -0.03
Magnus and Woodland (1987) -0.33 0.04 0.09 -0.24 -1.20 -0.29 -117.43 -0.00
Renou-Maissant (1999) -0.41 0.05 0.13 -0.19 -2.97 -0.66 -88.66 -0.01
a Elasticity estimates presented are the median estimates over all countries included in the study. A complete




∂W are given by (32), (33) and (34), respectively.
β∗ is deﬁned in Deﬁnition 2.
2035. The ﬁrst four columns in Table 3 contain the estimated own- and cross-
price elasticities for oil and electricity from ﬁve studies. Using the parameters
from Table 2, for each set of estimates we determine the change in oil extraction
and emissions and the intertemporal carbon leakage β∗ as a result of a tax
increase.
The intertemporal leakage rate is negative for most elasticity estimates. Be-
cause oil is expensive compared to coal in the future, a future carbon tax strongly
decreases the oil-to-coal price ratio. The cross-price eﬀect DF
Z is relatively high
compared to the own-price eﬀect DF
F. The tax-induced increase in future oil
demand through substitution from coal to oil outweighs the decrease through
higher own prices. As in Persson et al. (2007), the tax beneﬁts oil exporters.
Since oil is cheaper in the ﬁrst period than in the second, the own-price eﬀect
of oil is stronger in the ﬁrst period. When the oil price increases in the ﬁrst
period, the reduction in oil-related emissions exceeds the increase in coal-related
emissions. The elasticity estimates in Uri (1982) produce a positive leakage rate
as the high |ηF
F|/ηF
Z ratio causes the tax to accelerate oil extraction. The low




Z. The former results in smaller emission reductions from coal use in
the second period; the latter causes oil prices to increase more strongly, which
results in larger emission reductions in the ﬁrst period. The sum of period 1
and 2 emission reductions is almost linear in ηZ
Z, suggesting that the most im-
portant eﬀect of carbon taxes is the direct reduction in coal use. The estimated
emission reductions in the second period may be biased downwards, since we
conservatively assumed that oil reserves are fully exhausted.
Next, we estimate the magnitude of spatial carbon leakage. We disregard













Pindyck (1979) -0.25 0.03 0.03 -0.12 3.58 1.12 -3.22 0.35
Uri (1982) -0.57 0.05 0.15 -0.50 8.96 2.09 -11.03 0.19
Hall (1986) -0.70 0.09 0.24 -0.14 9.22 1.78 -4.58 0.39
Magnus and Woodland (1987) -0.33 0.04 0.09 -0.24 4.75 1.09 -5.37 0.20
Renou-Maissant (1999) -0.41 0.05 0.13 -0.19 5.66 1.17 -4.66 0.25
a Elasticity estimates presented are the median estimates over all countries included in the study. A complete




∂W are given by (32), (33) and (34), respectively.
β∗ is deﬁned in Deﬁnition 2.
the time dimension and evaluate the leakage to the rest of the world (ROW)
if the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) carbon price increases above its
current level of e15 per tonne.
Table 4 shows the eﬀects of a carbon tax increase in the EU. The spatial
leakage rates are positive, unlike most intertemporal rates in Table 3. The EU
consumes more oil compared to coal than the world at large, so the tax-induced
reduction in EU oil demand is larger than the increase through substitution
from coal to oil. A carbon tax increase in the EU therefore decreases world
oil prices. Energy demand in ROW is similar to global energy demand. Like
in the intertemporal calibration, a decrease in oil prices triggers an increase in
emissions in ROW. The spatial leakage rates are also larger than the intertem-
poral rates in absolute value, due to two reasons. Firstly, a tax increase has
a modest eﬀect on coal consumption in the EU, as coal demand in the EU is
already low to begin with. Secondly, the future tax in the previous calibration
is subject to a discount rate, whereas the unilateral tax is not. This exacerbates
the reaction of oil suppliers, also increasing the absolute value of the leakage
rate. Still, industry relocation eﬀects have to be large in order to generate full
leakage. Leakage is lower when coal demand is more elastic (as the tax then
decreases coal demand more strongly in the EU) and when oil demand is less
elastic (this weakens the reaction of oil suppliers).
4 A Cheaper Clean Backstop
In addition to implementing a carbon tax, climate-conscious countries may opt
to reduce emissions by stimulating the development of clean alternatives to fossil
14fuels. To model such a policy, we analyze the eﬀect of a reduction in the period
2 price of the clean backstop PC on emissions. The development of alternative
energy sources requires resources to be committed well before the new tech-
nology can be put to use, so exhaustible resource owners anticipate the lower
period 2 clean backstop prices when deciding on the intertemporal extraction
pattern. A lower PC reduces exhaustible resource demand in period 2, and
thus decreases the right hand side of (4). For exhaustible resource owners to
remain indiﬀerent between extracting in either period, period 1 extraction qF
must go up. This is the classic green paradox result (Strand, 2007; Hoel, 2011).
The improved technology also reduces emissions from the dirty backstop how-
ever. In the next Propositions, we show how the occurrence of the weak and the
strong green paradox depend on the emission intensities and the substitutability
between energy types.
Proposition 3 (weak green paradox). Assume DF
C > 0. When the clean back-
stop becomes cheaper in period 2, β∗   0 iﬀ
ζFdF
F + ζZdZ
F ⋚ 0 (13)
As opposed to the case of a future carbon tax, exhaustible resource own-
ers always bring forward extraction when clean alternatives become cheaper in
the future. The lower exhaustible resource prices also causes a drop in period
1 demand for the dirty backstop. The occurrence of the weak green paradox
hinges on whether the increase in exhaustible resource-related emissions out-
weighs the decrease in dirty backstop-related emissions (13). This is more likely
if the relative emission-intensity of the exhaustible resource is high and if the
substitutability between the exhaustible resource and the dirty backstop is low.




∂P c. Because period 2 parameters only aﬀect period 1 emis-
sions through this term, the condition for the weak green paradox consists solely
of period 1 parameters.










Table 2 shows that ζF/ζZ = 0.65 and qZ/qF = 0.91. Intertemporal leakage is
positive for −ηZ
F/ηF
F < 0.72. The elasticity ratio is considerably smaller than
0.72 for all studies in Tables 3 and 4, so the development of clean technologies
is likely to bring about the weak green paradox.
15Proposition 4 (strong green paradox). When the clean backstop becomes cheaper
in period 2,
(i) β∗ ≤ 1








F + ζZ  
dZ






(iii) β∗ increases in DF
C and |dF
F|





As substitute types become cheaper in both periods, demand for the dirty
backstop goes down in both periods. The strong green paradox arises if the
damage from bringing forward exhaustible resource emissions (1 − β)ζFdF
F ex-
ceeds the beneﬁts of reduced dirty backstop consumption in both periods. This
is more likely when DF
C is high, as a decrease in PC then poses a larger threat
to exhaustible resource demand in period 2. An increase in |dF
F| increases leak-
age by making it more attractive to shift exhaustible resource supply to period
1 (the reverse applies to |DF




high values of these parameters induce more substitution away from the dirty
backstop. We calibrate Proposition 4 at the end of this section.
By making stronger assumptions on the substitutability structure, we can
obtain more powerful results about the occurrence of the green paradox and
compare our ﬁndings with previous research. The energy market can be divided
into a submarket for electricity and one for transport. Natural gas (F), coal
(Z) and wind and solar energy (C) more readily lend themselves for electricity
generation, whereas oil (F), tar sands (Z) and biofuels (C) are primarily used
in the transportation sector. Two energy types that are employed in the same
submarket are close substitutes.
4.1 Developing Alternative Fuels
Suppose that the exhaustible resource and the clean backstop are perfect sub-
stitutes. We may think of the clean backstop as ethanol from sugarcane or corn,
competing with petroleum-based fuel. We are interested in this case as a refer-
ence point: the assumption that clean backstops are perfect substitutes for the
exhaustible resource is common in green paradox models. It leads to the most
powerful green paradox results in the literature. When the exhaustible resource
and the green backstop are imperfect substitutes, exhaustible resource owners
16are ensured of future demand for their commodity and the green paradox may
vanish (Gerlagh, 2011).
Corollary 1. With perfect substitution between the exhaustible resource and the
clean backstop
(i) if PC > Ψ, a decrease in PC has no eﬀect
(ii) if PC = Ψ, then β∗ > β if
(1 − β)ζFdF
F + ζZ  
dZ




When PC is suﬃciently low, it fully determines exhaustible resource prices
in both periods and the last term in (14) vanishes. In accordance with the
literature, the condition for the strong green paradox is weaker than in the gen-
eral case. Corollary 1 shows that if we take into consideration the availability
of dirty backstops, the substitutability structure that is most conducive to the
green paradox no longer suﬃces for its occurrence. Even when the exhaustible
resource and the clean backstop are perfect substitutes, both near-term emis-
sions and the emission damages may go down as a result of lower clean backstop
prices.
4.2 Renewable Energy for Electricity
An empirically relevant case is perfect substitutability between the clean and
dirty backstop. The opportunities to employ renewable energy are highest in
the electricity sector. Coal and renewable energy sources are main inputs for
electricity generation, with worldwide market shares of 42% and 19% in 2008
respectively (IEA, 2010). Investing in hydro-, wind- and solar power may reduce
coal use without causing a strong an increase in short-term oil extraction.
Corollary 2. With perfect substitution between the clean and the dirty backstop
(i) if PC > PZ, a decrease in PC has no eﬀect
(ii) if PC = PZ, the strong green paradox does not occur
(iii) if pC > pZ, PC < PZ, then β∗ > β iﬀ
(1 − β)ζFdF
F + ζZdZ
F < 0 (16)
(iv) if pC < pZ and PC < PZ, then β∗ = 1
When the clean backstop is more expensive than the dirty backstop in both
periods, the former is used in neither period and a small cost reduction has
17no eﬀect. When the period 2 prices of the clean and the dirty backstop are
equal, a reduction in the price of the clean backstop does not cause a strong
green paradox as it eliminates all demand for the dirty backstop. When the
clean backstop is already cheaper than the dirty backstop in the second period,
further cost reductions only reduce dirty backstop use in period 1, at the cost of
accelerated exhaustible resource extraction. When the clean backstop is cheaper
than the dirty backstop in both periods, the latter is never used. The model
then reduces to a classic green paradox model and both the weak and the strong
green paradox occur.
Keeping global warming within acceptable limits largely depends on replac-
ing coal as the largest source of electricity with clean alternatives. Our results
suggest that from an environmental point of view, investing in alternatives is
primarily attractive while they are more expensive than coal. Investment then
directly reduces future coal use, without bringing forward emissions from oil.
When cost parity is reached in the future, additional investment does not cause
a further reduction in future coal use, and only reduces present coal use in-
directly. The green paradox then becomes more likely. The above analysis is
complementary to Fischer and Salant (2010) and van der Ploeg and Withagen
(2011). Fischer and Salant (2010) analyze the eﬀect of cheaper backstops in
the presence of high- and low-cost oil. They ﬁnd that moderate cost reductions
for the backstop will cause the high-cost oil to remain in the ground and thus
improve the environment. Beyond that point, further investments will bring
forward extraction of the low-cost oil and cause a ’renewed’ green paradox.
Van der Ploeg and Withagen (2011) assume perfect substitutability between a
clean and a dirty backstop and note that subsidizing renewables to the cost of
the dirty backstop always reduces emissions.
4.3 Conventional and Unconventional Oil
In this subsection, we look at the eﬀects of cheaper renewable electricity on the
use of unconventional oil.
Corollary 3. With perfect substitution between the exhaustible resource and the
dirty backstop
(i) if ψ < pZ and Ψ < PZ, β∗ = 1
(ii) if ψ < pZ and Ψ = PZ, β∗ = 0
If the economy is in regime (ii), cost reductions beneﬁt the environment by
reducing the use of the dirty backstop in period 2, without aﬀecting exhaustible
18resource extraction. When the clean backstop is suﬃciently cheap, demand for
the dirty backstop in period 2 goes to zero. The economy then moves into
regime (i), in which additional investment only brings forward the extraction
of the exhaustible resource and the green paradox returns. When renewable
energy sources become economically viable as transportation fuel, they ﬁrst eat
into demand for unconventional oil without causing a green paradox.
4.4 Empirical Calibration
Finally, we calibrate Proposition 4. The interfuel substitution estimates in sec-
tion 3 do not distinguish between carbon- and non-carbon energy inputs. We
thus follow the CGE literature on carbon leakage and assume a nested CES
demand structure with two nests: electricity E and non-electricity N. Oil (F)
is the only energy source in the non-electricity nest; coal (Z) and solar energy
(C) are the only inputs for electricity generation. We have set the elasticity of
substitution between N and E at 1.5 and between Z and C at 5. Appendix I
contains a full description of the model and parameter values.
Figure 4.4 depicts the period 1 oil price. The oil price is decreasing in PC.
The eﬀect of PC on pF is modest for small cost reductions, owing to the limited
substitutability between oil and electricity. When the clean backstop becomes
very cheap, it emerges as an attractive substitute for oil and the oil price reacts
more strongly.
The pattern of intertemporal carbon leakage is similar (Figure 4.4). When
the reduction in PC is not too large, it mainly induces substitution from coal-
to solar-based electricity. The change in oil extraction is very small, giving rise
to very modest intertemporal leakage rates. The leakage rate goes up only when
the clean backstop becomes very cheap in the future: coal is then hardly used
anymore, and subsequent cost reductions mostly serve to bring forward oil ex-
traction. This ﬁnding complements the intuition behind Corollary 2, in which
the clean and dirty backstop are perfect substitutes. From an environmental
point of view, investment in renewable energy sources is primarily attractive in-
sofar as it reduces the use of dirty backstops. When this goal has been achieved,
intertemporal carbon leakage becomes a stronger concern.



























Reduction in clean backstop price, p0=46.25
Figure 1: Period 1 oil price as a function of period 2 cost reduction for the clean
backstop





































Reduction in clean backstop price, p0=46.25
 
 


































Figure 2: Intertemporal carbon leakage and period 2 coal consumption as a
result of a cheaper clean backstop in period 2
215 Conclusion
We employ a general model to analyze carbon leakage in the presence of an
abundant dirty backstop such as coal or unconventional oil. Our framework can
be used to study both intertemporal and spatial carbon leakage. The green para-
dox literature overstates the adverse consequences of imperfect climate policies
by not taking into account their potential to reduce emissions from coal and un-
conventional oil. It is important to consider these fuels as they already account
for 50% of energy-related emissions, and will become even more important in
the future.
A carbon tax increases the price of oil, but the price of coal goes up even
more. The eﬀect of an anticipated carbon tax on future oil demand depends on
the relative strength of a direct own-price and an indirect substitution eﬀect.
When improved technology (e.g. diesel from coal) makes coal a better substitute
for oil in the future than it is today, intertemporal leakage may become negative.
Anticipated carbon taxes cause signiﬁcant substitution from coal to oil in the
future and thereby induce oil owners to delay extraction. The reduction in
present oil supply does not trigger a large increase in coal demand, as coal is a
poor substitute for oil today. Future availability of cheap renewables lowers coal
emissions directly (through substitution from coal to renewables) and indirectly
(cost reductions for renewables decrease oil prices, reducing coal demand).
Calibrations of the model suggest that the eﬀects of anticipated climate
policies on present emissions are negligible compared to future emission reduc-
tions. Interestingly, we ﬁnd that a future carbon tax reduces present emissions.
When the EU unilaterally increases its carbon price, we ﬁnd carbon leakage
rates of 19-39%. From these results, it appears that spatial leakage is a stronger
concern than intertemporal leakage.
The aim of climate policy is to decrease cumulative extraction, i.e. ensuring
that some fossil fuels remain in the ground. The ’marginal resources’ are not
conventional oil and natural gas, which are so cheap to exploit that carbon taxes
will only aﬀect the distribution of rents and the timing of extraction. Climate
policy should rather aim at reducing emissions from costly, emission-intensive
and abundant resources such as coal and unconventional oil. The results from
this paper imply that these eﬀorts may be eﬀective, even if it is not possible to
instate all-encompassing carbon constraints.
22A Cross-Eﬀects
In this section, we show that cross-eﬀects are symmetric if we can deﬁne a
demand function for a composite good that is produced from the three energy
types according to a homogeneous function of degree k. Let



















The production function for the composite good can be written as X = Y k =
(f (  q))
k, where f (  q) is homogeneous of degree one. Deﬁne the conditional ex-
penditure function e(Y,  p) as the minimum cost to produce Y given prices   p.
Conditional demand for energy types exhibits symmetric cross-eﬀects:
∂e
∂pi = qi ≡   di (Y,  p)
∂e2
∂pi∂pj =
∂   di
∂pj
=
∂   dj
∂pi
By ﬁrst-degree homogeneity of f (  q), we have
∂   di
∂Y
=   di (1,  p)
Let π (  p) be the marginal cost of Y . Since f (  q) is homogeneous of degree one
∂π
∂pi =   di (1,  p)
Lastly, deﬁne demand for Y as dY (π (  p)) and the unconditional demand for
energy types di (  p) =   di  











∂   di
∂pj =   di (1,  p)
∂dY
∂π
  dj (1,  p) +










∂   dj
∂pi =   dj (1,  p)
∂Y
∂π
  di (1,  p) +
∂   dj
∂pi (18)
Since the conditional cross-eﬀects are equal, the unconditional cross-eﬀects are








∂pi = kY k−1∂dj
∂pi





23B Proof of Proposition 1










The result follows by substituting (9) and (10).
C Proof of Proposition 2
We ﬁrst show that the tax increases the consumer price of the exhaustible re-






Proof. Assume not. Then, because own-price eﬀects are stronger than cross-
price eﬀects (A2), exhaustible resource demand in period 2 decreases. The tax
increases the period 2 producer price PF − WζF as ∂P
Z
∂W = ζZ and ζF < ζZ.
By the Hotelling condition (6), pF increases and demand for the exhaustible
resource goes down in period 1. This violates the requirement that the stock is
fully exhausted.
Lemma 2 and (A2) entail ∂D
Z
∂W < 0, establishing (i). If the tax speeds up
extraction, i.e. if (9) is negative, we also have ∂d
Z
∂W < 0. Then (ii) and (iii) are
satisﬁed. We proceed to prove (ii) and (iii) when (9) is positive. The eﬀect of










































F       
III
+ζF ∂QF
∂W       
IV
(20)
By the inverse function theorem
ψF = 1/dF
F, ψj = −dF
j /dF
F, j ∈ {Z,C} (21)
The last equality in (20) follows from (21). In (20), I and II are negative and
III and IV positive. By (A2), I +III < 0. When (9) is positive, II +IV < 0.
24This completes the proof of (ii). To prove (iii), we show that the sum of period
1 and 2 dirty backstop demand goes down.
∂
 











































F + (1 + r)DZ
F
dF
F + (1 + r)DF









































= (1 + r)ψF
∂qF
∂W

















The second equality in (22) follows by substituting (23); the fourth by substi-
tuting (21) and (24). The fraction in (22) is smaller than one by (A2). The
ﬁrst inequality holds when (9) is positive; the second by (A2). Therefore, (22)
is negative when (9) is positive, completing the proof of (iii). Lastly, calculate
the eﬀect on emission damages
∂Σ
∂W
















































F + β (1 + r)DZ
F
  














F + ζZ  
dZ










The second equality in (25) follows from (23).
25D Proof of Proposition 3

















Analogously to C, we can back out
∂q
F






























The weak green paradox occurs when ∂e
∂P C < 0. As ψF < 0 and
∂q
F
∂P C < 0,
∂e
∂P C < 0 iﬀ ζFdF
F + ζZdZ
F < 0.
E Proof of Proposition 4
We established that ψF
∂q
F
∂P C < 0, so by (3), exhaustible resource prices in both
periods are increasing in PC. Then dZ, DZ, e + E and E are increasing in
PC. It follows that β∗ = − ∂e
∂P C / ∂E
∂P C ≤ 1, proving (i). The change in emission
damages is
∂Σ
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C + ζZ  
−DZ





F + (1 + r)DF
F
   (30)
The second equality follows from (21) and (28). By taking derivatives of (30),
we obtain (iii) and (iv).
F Proof of Corollary 1
We omit the proof of (i). For (ii), note that the price of the clean backstop fully

































 = 1 (31)
The DZ
C term in (29) is superﬂuous because of (31) and since dirty backstop
users are indiﬀerent between substituting to the exhaustible resource and to the
clean backstop. ∂Σ
∂P C then has the same sign as the term in square brackets in
(29).
G Proof of Corollary 2
We omit the proof of (i). For (ii), DZ is inﬁnitely elastic with respect to PC
at PC = PZ. From (30), we see that limDZ
C→∞ β∗ = 0. For (iii), DZ
C =
DF
Z = 0 when PC < PZ. It then follows that ∂Σ
∂P C has the same sign as
(1 − β)ζFdF
F + ζZdZ
F. For (iv), dZ
F = DZ
C = DF
Z = 0 when pC < pZ and
PC < pZ. We then have ∂Σ
∂P C < 0.
27H Proof of Corollary 3
The proof of (i) is analogous to the proof of (iv) in Corollary 2. For (ii), we see
in (30) that lim(DF
F ,DZ
F)→(−∞,+∞) β∗ = 0.
I Calibrations





∂W are given by (24), (19) and
(20) respectively15. Substituting elasticities for the partial derivatives of the
demand function and using the assumption that the elasticities are equal across





























































Table 1 lists the deﬁnitions and sources of the variables used for the calibrations
in Tables 3 and 4. In the calibrations for spatial leakage, PF and PZ are
inclusive of a e15 per tonne carbon tax. For each study in Tables 3 and 4,
we list the leakage estimates using per-country elasticity estimates in Tables 2
and 3.
For the calibrations in section 4.4, we employ the following model. Let X
denote compositie energy and indicate nests by k ∈ {N,E}. The elasticity of
substitution between and within nests is σX and σk, respectively. The value
share of nest k in composite energy demand is αX
k ; the share of type i in nest k
is αk
i . Denote available income by y. Then
15The derivation of these equations does not depend on assumption (A3).
28Table 1: Data deﬁnitions and sources for calibrations in section 3
Variable Deﬁnition Source
Intertemporal Model
qF, qZ Consumption in 2009, mln boea International Energy Statistics, EIA
QF, QZ Demand in 2035 in Current Policies scenario, mln boeb World Energy Outlook 2010 p.103, p.201, IEA
pF Brent crude spot price in 2009, $ per barrel BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2010, p. 16
PF Oil price in 2035 in Current Policies scenario, $ per barrel World Energy Outlook 2010, p.101, IEA
pZ, PZ Average EU steam coal import costs, $ per boeb Coal Information 2010, p. III.44, IEA
Spatial Model
qF, qZ Consumption in 2009 for ROW, mln boea International Energy Statistics, EIA
QF, QZ Consumption in 2009 for EU27, mln boea International Energy Statistics, EIA
PF, PZ pi + e15cζi, i ∈ {F,Z}
ζF, ζZ CO2 emissions from consumption by type in 2009, t
Consumption by type in 2009, boe
International Energy Statistics, EIA
a Converted from quad in source data b Converted from toe or tce in source data c Exchange rate: $1 = e0.719
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Canada -0.81 0.25 0.28 -0.14 -73.45 -15.40 -13.32 -1.16
France -0.20 -0.03 -0.03 -0.16 23.65 10.22 -89.79 0.11
Italy -0.29 0.05 0.04 -0.13 -6.66 -2.02 -61.39 -0.03
Japan -0.20 0.01 0.01 -0.12 5.53 1.89 -63.10 0.03
Netherlands -0.11 0.00 0.00 -0.07 3.22 1.18 -37.01 0.03
Norway -0.34 0.12 0.12 -0.08 -38.80 -8.01 -11.43 -0.70
Sweden -0.27 0.05 0.04 -0.12 -9.38 -2.80 -54.97 -0.05
UK -0.22 -0.02 -0.01 -0.15 17.32 6.67 -83.11 0.08
USA -1.10 0.35 0.11 -0.08 -103.66 -33.16 9.52 3.49
Germany 0.03 -0.09 -0.05 -0.12 38.49 -14.75 -120.31 -0.12
Uri (1982)
UK -0.57 0.05 0.15 -0.50 2.54 0.63 -249.35 0.00
Hall (1986)
France -0.70 0.09 0.24 -0.14 -7.82 -1.65 -54.32 -0.03
Magnus and Woodland (1987)
Netherlands -0.33 0.04 0.09 -0.24 -1.20 -0.29 -117.43 -0.00
Renou-Maissant (1999)
US -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 -0.06 15.87 8.16 -33.55 0.24
Canada -0.50 0.15 0.14 -0.27 -42.34 -10.13 -107.54 -0.09
Japan -0.34 0.12 0.13 -0.17 -36.98 -7.14 -57.34 -0.12
UK -0.49 0.06 0.17 -0.31 -4.75 -0.99 -146.85 -0.01
France -0.37 0.05 0.18 -0.26 -4.80 -0.70 -120.25 -0.01
Italy -0.41 0.05 0.09 -0.15 -1.16 -0.31 -71.42 -0.00
Germany -0.42 0.04 0.13 -0.19 2.92 0.66 -92.02 0.01














Canada -0.81 0.25 0.28 -0.14 -9.63 -1.85 1.45 1.28
France -0.20 -0.03 -0.03 -0.16 8.14 3.58 -7.27 0.49
Italy -0.29 0.05 0.04 -0.13 1.49 0.44 -3.74 0.12
Japan -0.20 0.01 0.01 -0.12 3.58 1.22 -4.40 0.28
Netherlands -0.11 0.00 0.00 -0.07 2.01 0.73 -2.57 0.29
Norway -0.34 0.12 0.12 -0.08 -6.05 -1.14 0.82 1.39
Sweden -0.27 0.05 0.04 -0.12 0.59 0.17 -3.15 0.05
UK -0.22 -0.02 -0.01 -0.15 6.76 2.62 -6.43 0.41
USA -1.10 0.35 0.11 -0.08 -14.06 -4.43 3.67 1.21
Germany 0.03 -0.09 -0.05 -0.12 9.36 -4.38 -7.38 -0.59
Uri (1982)
UK -0.57 0.05 0.15 -0.50 6.87 1.60 -14.86 0.11
Hall (1986)
France -0.70 0.09 0.24 -0.14 5.68 1.10 -4.54 0.24
Magnus and Woodland (1987)
Netherlands -0.33 0.04 0.09 -0.24 3.30 0.76 -7.04 0.11
Renou-Maissant (1999)
US -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 -0.06 4.32 2.30 -3.15 0.73
Canada -0.50 0.15 0.14 -0.27 -5.19 -1.17 -4.38 -0.27
Japan -0.34 0.12 0.13 -0.17 -5.59 -0.97 -1.65 -0.59
UK -0.49 0.06 0.17 -0.31 4.16 0.80 -8.79 0.09
France -0.37 0.05 0.18 -0.26 2.83 0.35 -6.94 0.05
Italy -0.41 0.05 0.09 -0.15 4.19 1.07 -5.01 0.21
Germany -0.42 0.04 0.13 -0.19 5.33 1.12 -6.29 0.18










































































i = 1. Demand in the second period is
described by a similar system. Exhaustible resource prices pi and Pi are en-
dogenously determined by (3) and dF + dF = S. The parameter values are
listed in Table 4. As (36) is homogenous of degree zero in S, y and Y , we
normalize S to one. Income is chosen such that Y = (1 + r)y and pF = 61.67
when PC = pC. The interest rate equals 2% per annum compounded over 26
years.
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